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Abstract 
This paper looks at Texas tort law reform to make claims regarding the 
relationship between Texas tort reform and damages recovered. Starting with reform in 
1977, Texas has passed 15 pieces of legislation that, in principle, restrict the damages 
plaintiffs recover. Most empirical analyses have focused primarily on analyzing behavior 
resulting from the tort reform. In other cases, research has looked at the impact the most 
recent reform has had on damages recovered in medical malpractice lawsuits. This paper 
is the first to study the impact of Texas tort law reform on damages recovered while 
looking at the entirety of recent law reform in the state. Specifically, I test the impact of 
the 15 different laws on total allocated loss, economic loss, and noneconomic loss 
recovered in all cases from 1988-2012. My findings suggest that caps on medical liability 
damages are successful at decreasing damages recovered when the cap is geared at either 
noneconomic damages, or a total damage figure that excludes punitive damages. This 
suggests that future caps on medical liability damages should explicitly cap either 
economic or noneconomic damages. Next, the results imply that caps on punitive damage 
legislature were most successful when using specific value caps paired with an evidence 
standard—caps of this nature decreased total damages by 28% in 1987 and 85% in 1995. 
Finally, an introductory legislation restricting the use of joint and several liability in cases 
when plaintiffs had little guilt was successful, it decreased total damages by 18.6%. This 
was followed by three failed attempts to impact the application of joint and several 
liability where the guilt threshold was higher, suggesting that joint and several liability is 
rarely used if the plaintiff has substantial guilt. 
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I. Introduction 
 There is a contentious debate regarding the ideal role tort law should play in each 
state. In particular, with sharp increases in health care costs, many look to tort law as a 
potential avenue for controlling the rising costs. Historically, the adoption of reform has 
been motivated as a way for the government to regulate costs at a state level. As a result, 
some legislation has capped damages paid, along with restricting scenarios in which a 
lawsuit can be filed. The question is whether or not the state level tort law reform 
succeeds at reducing payments in the tort system. By looking in depth at reform within 
Texas and the subsequent damages recovered, we have the opportunity to test the impact 
of these laws. While previous literature looks at behavior after reform, along with 
assessing the impact of the most recent Texas tort reform on medical malpractice lawsuits 
and corresponding payouts, this paper looks at the impact of the comprehensive recent 
history of tort reform and the impact those laws have on damages recovered.  
Tort law in Texas is known for aggressive conservative measures geared at 
protecting defendants’ rights and limiting the damages plaintiffs can recover. Starting 
with reform in 1977, Texas has passed 15 pieces of legislation that, in principle, restrict 
the damages plaintiffs recover. For the most part, the law reforms fall into three 
groupings—laws that limit recoverable damages in medical liability cases, caps on 
punitive damages, and restricting the application of joint and several liability. Texas’ 
aggressive history of reform has given the state the label of “the tort reform state.” 
(LeMance 2015).  
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 Most existing research focuses on the behavioral reaction to the changing laws. In 
particular, the most recent reform capping damages in medical liability cases has shifted 
the number of health care physicians in the state. Research shows that since the most 
aggressive medical liability reform in 2003 capping total damages, the number of 
physicians entering the state has increased by an average of 770 physicians each year 
compared to nine years prior (“10 Years of Tort Reform” 2013). Other research shows 
that since the reform, less money has been spent on defensive medicine—medicine 
doctors use to safeguard against a medical malpractice lawsuit. The report draws 
connections between the number of tort law reforms in each state and its negative 
relationship with health care costs (Hiltzik 2014). Some research contends that there is no 
evidence that the reform impacts health care costs (Paik et al., 2012).  
However, there is little existing research that looks at the potential causal 
relationship between Texas tort law reform and damages rewarded. With tort law, doctors 
are inclined to engage in defensive medicine to ensure they don’t get sued (Hiltzik 2014). 
Some doctors may even leave a state to avoid a lawsuit (“10 Years of Tort Reform” 
2013). The point of tort law reform is to undo these effects. In order for this to work, it 
follows that the payouts for plaintiffs are going to be lower. Has the reform succeeded at 
significantly impacting the size of damages recovered? While previous literature has 
briefly discussed the relationship between the 2003 noneconomic damage cap and 
payouts in medical malpractice cases (Hyman 2009), how has the entire recent history of 
Texas tort reform impacted damages recovered.  This report studies the empirical 
relationship between Texas tort law reform and damages recovered in order to evaluate 
whether or not the legislature makes any meaningful impact. At the end of this report, I 
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am able to contribute meaningful evidence regarding the effectiveness of state level tort 
law reform in impacting payouts.  
 I estimate each law reform’s effect on total allocated loss, economic loss, and 
noneconomic loss using the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim Survey. The 
Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim Survey has expansive closed claim data on 
225,791 observations beginning in 1988 and ending in 2012. In order to minimize 
multicollinearity, the law reforms that exist for the same period of time are grouped 
together into a single law reform variable. From this, the 15 law reforms are grouped into 
ten law reform variables. It’s also important to note that multiple of these law groupings 
overlap in years because multiple laws exist during a specific year within 1988-2012. By 
controlling for injury type, policy type, yearly trends, and other law reforms, I am able to 
make objective conclusions on each law reform variable’s impact on total allocated loss, 
economic loss, and noneconomic loss. Furthermore, in looking at the impact on each 
policy type, I can infer whether or not a law primarily impacts a specific area sector. For 
the remainder of this paper, I will refer to the different sectors as policy types.  
 In order to help organize the results and make claims regarding the impact of each 
law theme, the results section of this paper is organized into three sections—caps on 
medical liability damages, caps on punitive damages, and joint and several liability 
reform. 
 My findings for the first section suggest that the law reforms that cap damages in 
medical liability cases have mixed results. The first two reforms were passed in 1977 and 
are split in their effectiveness. The results suggest that a cap on total damages in medical 
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liability claims can have a substantial impact on economic and noneconomic damages, 
but if punitive damages are included in the total damages calculation, there is no 
perceived impact. In 2003, nearly 30 years later, a final law reform grouping geared at 
more effectively restricting damages in medical liability cases was passed. The results 
suggest that this reform succeeded at decreasing noneconomic damages by almost 10%. 
From this, we can infer that the influx of doctors into Texas post 2003 is consistent with 
the decreasing damages recovered. The success of this final law suggests that capping 
noneconomic damages specifically is an effective way to impact payouts within medical 
malpractice cases. Finally, my results suggest that the cap on noneconomic damages in 
medical liability cases created a culture of decreasing damages that pervaded into other 
policy types.  
 The second section of law reforms was aimed at capping punitive damages over 
time. After a failed attempt in 1973, a new legislation was passed in 1987 that 
successfully decreased total allocated loss by 28%. This lasted until 1995, when a 
Republican controlled legislature instituted a more restrictive reform that decreased total 
allocated loss by more than 85%. Taken together, my results suggest that after the first 
failed attempt, Texas legislators became more aware of the nature of punitive damage 
lawsuits in terms of size and ideal threshold of guilt, and as a result have succeeded at 
decreasing punitive damages over time.  
 Finally, the last section of reforms restricts the application of joint and several 
liability. Our findings imply that the first legislation with this aim succeeded in 
decreasing total damages by 18.6%. However, the following three joint and several 
5 
 
liability reforms result in no meaningful decrease to damages. While potential 
multicollinearity exists for these variables, our results do imply that Texas legislators 
were able to account for most joint and several liability applications in an introductory 
constraint, and were able to successfully limit damages recovered. 
 The paper proceeds as follows: Section II provides background information on 
tort law in Texas, the different kinds of damages in tort law, and previous research 
looking at Texas tort law reform. Section III highlights the data sources used. Section IV 
describes the empirical specification for our analysis along with laying out the 
organization of how our results are specified. Section V illustrates our results and 
implications for these findings. Finally section VI offers a conclusion and possible 
suggestions for future study.  
II. Background 
II.A. The Tort Reform State 
The size and significance of Texas reform over the last twenty years has earned it 
the name of “the tort reform state” (LeMance 2015). See Table 1 in Appendix for a 
detailed description of the notable reform since 1987 complied by Ronen Avraham at the 
University of Texas School of Law (Avraham 2014). The majority of the reform limits 
the damages plaintiffs can recover. 
The debate over whether or not the significant tort law reform has a positive 
impact on Texas is incredibly contentious. It is worth noting that while the reform does 
span across multiple types of law, there is a substantial portion (especially some of the 
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more recent reform) that is specifically geared towards medical malpractice cases. 
Advocates of the reform argue that it both encourages an influx of doctors into the state 
and decreases the dollars spent on defensive medicine. Since some of the most aggressive 
medical malpractice reform in 2003, the state has licensed on average 3,134 new 
physicians a year. This is nearly 770 more physicians when compared with the average 
nine years prior. This suggests that the significant reform encouraged doctors to work in 
Texas (“10 Years of Tort Reform” 2013).  In addition to the influx of doctors, the new 
reform decreases the defensive medicine that is infamous for increasing health care costs. 
Defensive medicine is defined as any unnecessary treatment or service health care 
physicians perform in order to mitigate the potential of a medical malpractice lawsuit. In 
a study led by Michael Rothberg at the Cleveland Clinic and published in the Journal of 
the American Medical Association, Rothberg claims that spending toward defensive 
medicine is nearly 78 billion (Hiltzik 2014). By decreasing the likelihood of being 
slapped with a medical malpractice lawsuit, the reform discourages doctors from 
engaging in defensive medicine, in turn decreasing overall healthcare costs.  
On the other hand, an argument can be made that the reform is disruptive because 
it can theoretically take advantage of the injured. The defensive techniques mentioned 
earlier often ensure consumers’ safety. One could argue that by discouraging doctors, 
automobile companies, product manufacturers, etc. from spending this defensive money, 
they’re simultaneously decreasing the safety of these products and services. Also, 
opponents argue that whether or not a threshold of liability has been reached by the 
plaintiff, if there is any fault of someone else damages should be recovered. By not 
holding those at fault accountable, and therefore limiting the amount defendants have to 
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pay, plaintiffs are unable to recover the complete size of the damages they deserve 
(Goguen 2015).  By looking at the size of damages recovered before and after each 
reform, this report tests whether or not the legislation actually impacts the money 
plaintiffs receive. 
II.B. The Different Components of Damages 
In order to better understand the nature of the reform, and begin to recognize the 
impact it has on damages recovered, it’s necessary to explore its various components. In 
this section of the paper, we will explicitly define the three components that make up the 
total damages recovered in tort law.  
Economic Loss 
According to Texas law, “economic damages means compensatory damages 
intended to compensate a claimant for actual economic or pecuniary loss” (“Civil 
Practice and Remedies Code” 2013).  Put more simply, if a product or service causes 
personal injury to the consumer, the economic loss is the cost of the original product or 
medical cost, in addition to future medical costs and any lost wages. Economic loss is 
organized into two subcategories—direct economic loss and consequential economic loss 
(“Economic Loss Doctrine in All 50 States” 2015). The direct economic loss is the 
difference between the value of the product or service with and without the malfunction. 
This is also defined by the cost of replacement or to repair a product or service. For 
example, if a doctor is found guilty of medical malpractice during a patient’s back 
surgery and causes more damage, the direct economic loss is the cost of another surgery 
to repair the injury—the medical costs. The consequential economic loss is harder to 
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calculate—it’s all indirect loss of benefit from the service or product error. This includes 
any loss of profit due to one’s inability to use a product or lack of service performed. In 
the back surgery example above, the consequential economic loss is the patient’s lost 
wages caused by the additional weeks off of work. If the patient works in construction, he 
would not be able to go back to work for a longer period of time, potentially increasing 
the consequential economic loss substantially. The lawsuits analyzed in this report deal 
mostly with direct economic loss—in this case the medical costs as opposed to lost 
wages. 
Noneconomic Loss 
 Texas law defines noneconomic loss as the “damages awarded for the purpose of 
compensating a claimant for physical pain and suffering, mental or emotional pain or 
anguish, loss of consortium, disfigurement, physical impairment, loss of companionship 
and society, inconvenience, loss of enjoyment of life, injury to reputation, and all other 
nonpecuniary losses of any kind other than exemplary damages” (“Civil Practice and 
Remedies Code” 2013). Because it is not a value that is traded on the market, but rather 
an impact on a person’s personal welfare, calculating a particular value can be 
problematic. However, depending on the nature of the case, because it is the effect on 
one’s own welfare, noneconomic losses can have a substantially larger impact that 
economic loss.
1
 Using the example highlighted above of the medical malpractice lawsuit, 
                                                          
1
 In Stacey Galette vs. Winthrop Hospital, Galette sued the Brooklyn hospital for a botched surgery geared 
at removing an ectopic pregnancy. When the hospital was late in noticing a 5-millimeter hole in her colon, 
Galette had an infection that quickly led to blood poisoning. After extensive time in intensive care, she 
had both legs amputated and suffered significant hearing loss. The jury awarded Galette 62 million dollars 
total—$20 million for past pain and suffering, $38 million for future pain and suffering, and $4 million for 
medical expenses. In this instance, the economic damages awarded were just $4 million. However, due to 
9 
 
perhaps the error in surgery caused a back injury that is permanent. Now, the patient will 
suffer from mild back pain for the rest of his life. The resulting loss of enjoyment to his 
life is worth a lot more than the medical costs. In this case, the noneconomic loss is 
greater than the economic loss. 
Punitive Damages 
 Punitive damages are the most disputed source of damages rewarded in lawsuits. 
In certain circumstances, if the court feels that the damages rewarded from the economic 
loss and non-economic loss are not a sufficient punishment, they add additional punitive 
damages. They are used primarily as a deterrence for the defendant, and others who may 
find themselves in an analogous situation, from future similar behavior. Punitive damages 
are often rewarded in situations where the defendant acts in a particularly unethical 
manor.
2
 It’s worth noting that while punitive damages only constitute 1-4% of total 
malpractice awards, the impact of punitive damages on physician behavior can appear 
much larger (Malani and Reif 2010). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
the nature of the medical malpractice, the noneconomic loss was significantly larger. The $20 million for 
past pain and suffering, and $38 million for future pain and suffering, both are noneconomic damages 
recovered (Garcia, 2010). 
2
 Henry and Lorraine Chanin sued the Teva Parenteral Medicine and Baxter Healthcare Services for claims 
that the product propofol, often used for anesthetic, can cause a patient to get hepatitis C. Henry Chanin 
was infected with hepatitis C in 2006 when he was given the anesthetic at Desert Shadow Endoscopy 
Center. The case relied on the fact that the drug packaging did not include sufficient warning that reusing 
the vials causes hepatitis C. Despite knowledge that the package had insufficient labeling, and that nurses 
were misinterpreting the vials ability to be reused, the drug companies continued selling them because 
they were profitable. The jury awarded Chanin $356 million of punitive damages from Teva and $144 
million of punitive damages from Baxter, based on the profit figures from the companies. In this instance, 
punitive damages were awarded to punish Teva and Baxter for their unethical and dangerous behavior 
that caused a major spread of hepatitis C. Furthermore, by coming down hard on drug companies that 
choose personal profit over ensuring patient safety, the jury deters future instances of similar behavior 
from other drug companies (German et al., 2010). 
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II.C. Current Research Fails to Discuss Comprehensive Relationship between Reform 
and Payouts 
 As highlighted previously, Texas tort law reform has been a major source of 
debate over the last couple of decades. Given the large impact it has had on medical 
professionals behavior, and the perceived impact the reform has had on the entire tort law 
system, it’s worthwhile to investigate the reform’s influence on the various components 
of damages mentioned above. That is to say, quantitatively, what impact has the reform 
had on the economic loss, noneconomic loss, punitive damages, and total allocated loss 
rewarded to plaintiffs in Texas tort law. From this, I am able to discuss the effectiveness 
of tort law reform in impacting payouts. 
 As shown in II. A. The Tort Reform State, some previous research investigates the 
reform’s impact on health care professionals behavior over time; there has been an influx 
of doctors into Texas, and potentially fewer “defensive surgeries”. The American 
Medical Association no longer labels Texas as one of its states in crisis (Nixon 2013). 
Access to healthcare is clearly at unprecedented levels in Texas due to the huge increase 
in health care professionals (“10 Years of Tort Reform” 2013). 
Avraham’s paper The Impact of Tort Reform on Employer-Sponsored Health 
Insurance Premiums also makes claims regarding the tort reform’s impact on defensive 
medicine and aggregate health care costs (Avraham, et al., 2010). President Obama 
contributed to the discussion on defensive medicine in fall 2009, stating, “I don’t believe 
malpractice reform is a silver bullet, but I have talked to enough doctors to know that 
defensive medicine may be contributing to unnecessary costs” (Paik et al., 2012). 
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Avraham uses his research on tort law reform broken down by state to discuss the direct 
relationship between tort reform and aggregate health care costs by state—suggesting that 
as tort reform increases, defensive health care decreases” (Avraham, et al., 2010). This 
further implies that Texas doctors’ behaviors have in fact been shaped by the Texas 
reform—their fear of a medical malpractice lawsuit has decreased where they are no 
longer engaging in the same level of defensive health care, potentially cutting health care 
costs. 
Bernard Black at the University of Northwestern School of Law looked more into 
the relationship between tort reform in Texas and aggregate health care costs. Dissimilar 
to Avraham, Black was unable to find any evidence showing a relationship between 2003 
Texas tort reform and health care costs. By looking at Medicare spending and spending 
trends at the county level before and after the reform, the paper found no decrease in 
aggregate spending. In order to potentially control for increasing health care costs at a 
country wide level, the paper compared Medicare spending in Texas to spending levels 
and trends in other states at the same time. There was no evidence suggesting the 2003 
tort reform impacted any Medicare spending in Texas (Paik et al., 2012). Still, this paper 
does not track the reform’s impact on the payout. 
Before recently, there was not sufficient data to track the damages recovered over 
time in order to make claims on the impact the reform has had on size and quantity of tort 
lawsuits. The Texas Department of Insurance (TDI) has recently made available claim 
level data that is essential to our understanding of tort lawsuits in Texas. However, 
previous research has used this information primarily to analyze the relationship between 
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these lawsuits, the liability system in general, and the insurance market within Texas. 
Kathryn Zeiler’s paper on Medical Malpractice Liability Crisis or Patient Compensation 
Crisis uses the data to suggest a patient liability system in crisis, as opposed to a system 
that blames rising insurance premiums on the medical malpractice liability system.  The 
paper claims that the patient liability system is in crisis because it “severely limit[s] the 
ability of the liability system to deliver civil justice negligently injured patients” (Zeiler 
2009).   
Perhaps the most relevant previous research comes from David Hyman and 
Bernard Black in 2009 in Estimating the Effect of Damages Caps in Medical Malpractice 
Cases: Evidence from Texas. In this paper, the researchers begin to look at the 
relationship between reform and payouts by estimating the impact of the 2003 Texas 
reform on all jury verdicts, post-verdict payouts, and settlements in medical malpractice 
cases closed in 1988-2004. The results suggest that the 2003 cap on noneconomic 
damages impacted 47% of verdicts by reducing the mean total payout by 27% and the 
noneconomic damages by 73% (Hyman et al., 2009). This evidence implies that the 2003 
reform was successful at impacting medical malpractice damages recovered. However, 
this paper still does not discuss the history of Texas tort reform in its entirety. By 
narrowing in on one specific law from 2003 and focusing on the medical malpractice 
policy type, the paper is unable to make comprehensive claims regarding the tort reform 
system in Texas.  
A later paper by Hyman and Black in 2013 discusses tort reform and payouts in 
medical malpractice lawsuits on a national level. Looking at national medical malpractice 
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claims in the 1990s and 2000s, the researchers find strong evidence that damage caps 
have a strong impact at reducing the payout per physician within a state (Paik et al., 
2013). While this research aids our understanding on medical malpractice caps on 
damages recovered on a national level, it doesn’t consider other policy types within tort 
law reform nor focuses its analysis on the complex history of Texas reform. 
There is no current research with the main emphasis of exploring the quantitative 
impact that all tort law reform has had on payouts—both in terms of dollar value and size 
of damages recovered. That is to say that the current research does not provide evidence 
on the complete recent history of the reform’s ability to influence payments. More than 
just the 2003 cap on noneconomic damages, how has the rest of Texas tort reform 
impacted damages recovered? Beyond solely medical malpractice lawsuits, how has the 
reform impacted other policy areas? While some reform geared at capping damages 
applies solely to medical malpractice lawsuits, has it created a culture of lower damages 
that has pervaded into other policy types? How has the other types of tort law reform, 
including restricting joint and several liability and placing caps on punitive damages, 
affected payouts?  In this empirical work, we make connections between the 
comprehensive recent history of tort reform in Texas and its impact on the size of 
damages rewarded. From this, we are able to provide evidence regarding tort law 
reform’s success in influencing payouts. 
III. Data 
My primary data source is the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim 
Survey. The Texas Department of Insurance aims to “regulate the insurance industry 
14 
 
fairly and diligently, promote a stable and competitive market, and provide information 
that makes a difference.” Created in 1876, the Texas Department of Insurance has a 
history of “protect[ing] policyholders and serv[ing] the greater public interest through the 
effective regulation of the U.S. insurance marketplace” (About TDI). As a subsector of 
the Property and Casualty Reports, the Closed Claim Annual Reports began collecting 
data in 1988 after a sudden increase in insurance premiums for medical malpractice cases 
(Zeiler 2009).  The Closed Claim Survey collects entry level data, including information 
on liability, the type of injury, type of claim, jury verdicts, types of insurance used, and 
size of the economic loss, noneconomic loss, and total allocated loss in various situations. 
The survey collects information on 220 different variables in order to fully understand the 
nature of each claim. There are 225,791 entries from 1988-2012. Table 3 reports the 
descriptive statistics for every variable within the regression. 
I ran three types of regressions, using three unique dependent variables—
economic loss, non-economic loss, and total allocated loss. All of these variables were 
adjusted for CPI and brought from their value during the year of injury to their 2012 
values. There are four types of variables controlled for in each regression. First, I 
controlled for type of injury, using binary variables for the 33 different injury types. If the 
injury occurred within the specific claim, the variable took on the number 1, and if it 
didn’t occur, it takes on a 0. Table 2 lists all of the variables used and the type of variable. 
The 33 different injury types are included as independent variables and highlighted in 
Table 2. The name of the variable highlights the nature of the injury. For example, 
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“railway” means injury on a railway while “eye injury (blindness)” means the injury 
caused the person to be blind.
3
  
Next, I controlled for the five policy types included in the survey listed in Table 
2.
4
 In the regression, the policy type variable is labeled as “categorical,” and would take 
on the value of 1-5 depending on the policy type. It would equal 1 if monoline general 
liability, 2 if commercial auto liability, 3 if texas commercial multiperil, 4 if medical 
professional liability, and 5 if medical professional liability. The descriptive statistics in 
Table 3 for the “categorical” variable is therefore not helpful for interpretation.  
We also included year variables to account for the upward trend in damages 
awarded over time. Because this upward trend is not a result of the effectiveness of a law, 
year variables need to be included in the regressions. The year we included in the 
regression is the year the claim was closed. The average year used for the sample was 
1990 and ranged from 1988 to 2010.  
Finally, I generated law variables so we can read the impact that each existing law 
has on the loss values. Each law variable only exists for the time the law was effective—
meaning if a law was adjusted after 3 years, the variable only exists for the three years the 
                                                          
3
 This was important to control for in that the damages awarded to the more extreme 
injuries are larger. If our goal is to lean about the relationship between a law change and 
the different kinds of losses, we don’t want the varying injury severities to have an 
impact. In Table 3, it shows that 7.7% of injuries include death, while only .4% include 
falls. Because death is by nature more extreme, and would result in more extreme 
damages paid when compared with falls, we must control for it in order to limit its impact 
on the output variable. 
4
 This is also essential to control for because the size and nature of the payout for each 
policy type is innately different—the policy type impacts the size of economic loss, non-
economic loss, and total allocated loss. We need to include these as independent variables 
in order account for this disparity. 
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law was effective. The laws used are the laws described in Table 1. The law reform is 
pulled from the Database of State Law Reforms (5
th
 edition) complied by Ronen 
Avraham  at the University of Texas at Austin- School of Law in May 2014. The 
database includes the “most prevalent tort reforms in the United States between 1980 and 
2012.” Avraham used existing data, original legislation, and case law to build the dataset. 
The fifth addition corrects for errors in the previous four editions and standardizes reform 
terminology (Avraham 2014).  It is important to note that while there are 15 laws, there 
are only 10 law variables. Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 1, Caps 
on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability 2), and Periodic Payments (Medical 
Liability), Caps on Punitive Damages 2 and Punitive Damages (Evidence) 2, Caps on 
Punitive Damages 1 and Punitive Damages (Evidence) 1, Caps on Punitive Damages 
(Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability) and Comparative Fault were each combined 
into one variable each because they are effective for the same time period. That is to say 
that because both Caps on Punitive Damages 2 and Punitive Damages (Evidence) 2 were 
both effective on September 1, 1995, I only generated one variable to encompass both 
laws. Often times, these laws were part of a grouping geared at having one impact, in this 
case decreasing punitive damages awarded, so interpreting them as one variable makes 
sense. This also helps decrease multicollinearity within the regression. From this 
combined variable, we are able to interpret the impact both laws have on damages. See 
Table 4 for a graphical representation of the timing of the law changes to understand the 
law progression and which laws overlap. 
IV. Empirical Specification 
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 Theoretically, tort law reform in Texas would result in some sort of change in the 
level of payout—the extent of this change and the nature of what kind of damages it 
impacts is dependent on what reform we’re looking at. For example, if there is a law 
passed that caps noneconomic damages, one would assume that there were previous 
instances of noneconomic damages recovered greater than this cap. By getting rid of 
these high noneconomic damage payouts, there would then be smaller values of 
noneconomic damages rewarded overall. With our regression in mind, it would follow 
that “Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 1, Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages  (Medical Liability) 2, Periodic Payments (Medical Liability)” would decrease 
noneconomic loss. 
 From this theory, I concentrated the majority of my empirical analysis on the 
relationship between the law reforms and the changes in loss. I started by looking at the 
relationship between the law reforms and changes in total allocated loss. By comparing 
the direction and the extent of this change with the relationship between the law reforms 
and the changes in both economic loss and non-economic loss, I’m able to make more 
specific claims about the emphasis of each law reform and its pursuant effect.   
 In analyzing this impact, I used two different regression types for each of the 
three types of losses. First, I used regressions with all of the law variables included as 
independent variables. It is this type of regression that I used for the majority of the 
analysis. The regression results for this group are summarized in Table 5. It’s necessary 
to include each of the law variables in this regression group because it’s not as though 
only one law exists at once. Because these reforms build upon each other and often 
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overlap, we need to acknowledge that other laws are potentially impacting the dependent 
variables (the values of the damages) at the same time. By not including them, there 
would be omitted variable bias.  Therefore, the three regressions in this grouping are of 
the following form: 
1)                                                           
                                                 
                                          
where i is denoted by the individual. The independent variable                     is an 
indicator that takes on the value of the year the claim was closed. For example, if the      
claim was closed in 1988,                     would equal 1988.          is an 
indicator equal to one if the injury included death. This is the same way to interpret all 33 
injury type variables from          to         .               is an indicator equal to 1 if 
the policy type is monoline general liability, 2 if commercial auto liability, 3 if Texas 
commercial multiperil, 4 if medical professional liability, and 5 if other professional 
liability.                 is an indicator if the law reform “Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical Liability 1, Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 2, 
Periodic Payments (Medical Liability)” is effective during the ist claim. Each law 
variable is a similar indicator variable if the law reform is effective for the     claim. The 
dependent variable          is the natural log of g where g is either total allocated loss, 
economic loss, or noneconomic loss. Finally,   is the constant term in the regression.  
The summary table for the second regression grouping is shown in Table 6. In this 
grouping, I went through each of the ten law variables and created ten new regressions 
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that only have one law variable in each. This process was repeated for the three types of 
independent variables—total allocated loss, economic loss, and noneconomic loss. By 
comparing the coefficients of the law variables to the coefficients of the law variables in 
the first grouping of regressions explained above, I am able to assess the multicolinearity 
of each law. If the coefficients are drastically different between the two regression 
groupings for the same law variable with the same dependent variable, then it would 
follow that the law variable is strongly correlated with another one of the law variables. 
This serves as a check on the quality of the data. The regressions in this grouping are of 
the following form: 
1)                                                           
                                                 
where all of the variables have the same denotation as the previous grouping of 
regressions.                 is the law variable for the      law where the      law 
is one of the ten Texas tort law reforms laid out in Table 1.  
In several instances, it is worthwhile to look at the specific policy type that is 
most impacted by each reform. In a few cases, the reform only applies to a specific policy 
type. For example, the reforms included in the variable “Caps on Noneconomic Damages 
(Medical Liability) 1, Caps on Noneconomic Damages  (Medical Liability) 2, Periodic 
Payments (Medical Liability)” is specified to the medical liability policy type. As a 
result, one would think the impact on damages is solely on medical liability claims. This 
would suggest that in the regression, the only significant impact this reform has would be 
in the medical professional liability policy type. By analyzing the potential impact on 
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other policy types, we are able to discuss the degree of interconnectedness between each 
policy type within Texas tort law. 
Finally, as shown in Table 1, a few of the law reforms have similar aims. For 
example, there are multiple laws that relate to capping medical liability damages, 
restricting joint and several liability, and capping punitive damages. My empirical 
analysis is not only focused on each law variable separately, but also groups the law 
variables together by reform type in order to comment on the success of each reform goal 
over time.  
V. Results and Implications 
The results are presented by reform grouping—caps on medical liability damages, 
caps on punitive damages, and joint and several liability reform. First, I analyze the 
impact of each law variable separately, and next I make assertions about the effectiveness 
of each reform grouping. 
V. A. Caps on Medical Liability Damages 
 In this section, we analyze the three law variables, consisting of five law reforms, 
that relate to medical liability.  
The history of Texas medical malpractice law reform began on August 29, 1977 
when total damages for medical liability (excluding medical costs) were limited to 
$500,000 (indexed to CPI). Theoretically the impact of this law would be to decrease the 
total damages rewarded, in turn limiting the defensive medical costs by ensuring doctors 
there won’t be large claims brought against them. The name of this law variable in our 
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regression is “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 
2.” Part of this same law package however, and effective on the same August 29, 1977 
date, is the second law reform, “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non 
Wrongful Death Claims) 1.” This law also capped total damages for medical liability at 
$500,000, however now both punitive damages and medical costs were excluded from 
this cap. The reason for not including them in the same law variable is that the first part, 
“Caps on Total Damages (Medical liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 2, officially 
ended in 1988. Because they were both listed separately, and one ended in 1988 while the 
other one still exists, I felt it necessary to include each of them as their own variable to 
isolate their potential success. 
“Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 2,” the 
law that does not specify that punitive damages are excluded from the cap, does not show 
a significant decrease in total allocated loss. Rather, the coefficient from this independent 
variable is positive at .383, as shown in Table 5. This can be explained by the fact that 
when this specific law was taken out of action on May 11, 1988, there was another law 
that existed with a very similar aim, “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non 
Wrongful Death Claims) 1.” The only difference between the two laws  is that the second 
one excluded punitive damages from the cap on total damages. Therefore, it’s fair to 
argue that “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 2” 
has no meaningful effect on the total damages. 
However, there is a significant effect within the second part of the law package 
that still exists today, “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death 
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Claims) 1.” Because the cap on total damages for this law excluded punitive damages, 
and the total allocated loss figure included punitive damages, our empirical analysis only 
focuses on the economic loss and non-economic loss regressions. As shown in Table 5, 
since this law has been enacted, damages through economic loss are on average 42.9% 
lower, and damages through non-economic loss are on average 37.6% lower. This effect 
is statistically significant at the 1% significance level for both the economic loss and 
noneconomic loss regressions. This would suggest that the law succeeded in decreasing 
the size of total damages (excluding punitive damages).  
By looking at the policy type specifications in Table 7, we can learn whether or 
not the law reform impacted the total allocated loss figure for all policy types. Did the 
law solely impact economic and noneconomic damages in the Medical professional 
liability policy type as intended, or did the cap on total damages create a culture of 
limiting damages that pervaded into other policy types? The results, as highlighted in 
Table 7, show no evidence that  “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non 
Wrongful Death Claims) 1,” geared at decreasing damages solely in Medical professional 
liability, decreases the total allocated loss in any of the policy types. This can potentially 
be explained by the fact that the law capped total damages excluding punitive damages, 
and therefore wouldn’t have an impact on a total allocated loss figure that included 
punitive damages from any policy type. Regardless, the results highlight how the law 
reform “Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Non Wrongful Death Claims) 1” did 
succeed at decreasing economic loss and non-economic loss, and did not impact the total 
allocated loss figure for any policy type.  
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The final law reform in this grouping was adopted in early September 2003, and 
consisted of three parts. The first part, “Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical 
Liability) 2,” is a constitutional amendment that gave Texas Legislature the power to 
place limits on noneconomic damages for healthcare related lawsuits. The second part, 
“Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability 1),” took advantage of the preceding 
amendment by capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice cases against 
doctors to $250,000 per facility and $500,000 overall. The final part, Periodic Payments 
(Medical Liability), allowed the court to order future damages above $100,000 be paid in 
periodic payments. The goal of all three of these laws was to expand upon the previous 
medical liability reform from nearly thirty years prior. By further capping damages, and 
giving guilty doctors the ability to pay large damages in periodic payments, the court 
aims to decrease the size of lawsuits filed against doctors. The results, laid out in Table 5, 
imply that the law succeeded in decreasing the noneconomic loss figure. More 
specifically, with the law reform package “Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical 
Liability) 1, Caps on Noneconomic Damages (Medical Liability) 2, Periodic Payments 
(Medical Liability” effective, noneconomic loss decreased by 9.78%. This figure proved 
to be statistically significant at the 5% significance level. In line with the reform geared 
solely at affecting non-economic loss, there is no evidence of an impact on economic 
loss. These results imply that the reform was successful at limiting the damages filed 
against doctors, and that the substantial increase in physicians moving to Texas since this 
reform is warranted. 
It is interesting to note that there is a significant decrease in total allocated loss 
within each policy type, not just within medical professional liability. Despite the nature 
24 
 
of the cap geared at decreasing noneconomic damages within the medical professional 
liability policy type, all of the policy types had a significant decrease in total allocated 
loss as shown in Table 7. This demonstrates the fact that a reform within one policy type 
has the potential to change the trend of damages within other policy types as well. In this 
case, the cap to noneconomic damages in medical professional liability pervaded into 
other policy types and led to across the board decreases. This suggests that lawmakers 
need to be conscious about the indirect effects of reform on other aspects of tort law. 
V. B. Caps on Punitive Damages 
The next grouping of laws includes four different law reforms—three related to 
capping punitive damages, and one introducing comparative fault. As described below, 
these reforms have been combined into three law variables for my analysis.  
The first two law reforms were passed in 1973 and further limit the potential 
damages claimants can seek. Because of high correlation with one another, and in order 
to avoid multicollinearity, I have combined these reforms into one law variable: “Caps on 
Punitive Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability), Comparative Fault.”  
The first reform, “Comparative fault,” reduces the claimant’s damages by the proportion 
of his or her fault, and restricts claimants from filing damages if his or her fault is greater 
than 50%. Success for this law would result in both a decrease in the number of claims 
filed and a decrease in the size of the claim. The second reform, “Caps on Punitive 
Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability),” limits the size of the punitive 
damages to three times economic damages, with the aim of restricting large punitive 
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damage payments. Success for this reform would decrease the size of punitive damages 
recovered.  
The results, however, suggest there is no evidence that the law variable “Caps on 
Punitive Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability), Comparative Fault” 
decreases punitive damages. Rather, there shows a significant increase in total allocated 
loss after the laws were enacted. However, when looking at the regression in Table 6, the 
regressions that only include the one relevant law variable, there is no evidence of an 
impact either way. This potentially suggests a correlation between “Caps on Punitive 
Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability), Comparative Fault” and the other 
laws. Initially, I thought one possible explanation for the lack of meaningful impact was 
that in capping punitive damages to three times the economic damages, economic 
damages increased as well. That said, there shows no evidence of an increase in 
economic loss since the law became effective, discounting this theory. According to the 
Journal of Consumer & Commercial Law, the extent to which this law was followed, 
meaning a conservative interpretation or a liberal interpretation of the law, has developed 
over time. Those enforcing the law have also varied in their level of enforcement 
(Alderman 2005). This large level of variability since the law was passed in 1973 can 
potentially explain the lack of punitive damage reduction. Furthermore, the same 
explanation can be given for lack of impact from “Comparative fault.” Perhaps the 
variability in “Caps on Punitive Damages (Deceptive Trade Practice, Product Liability)” 
limited the impact of “Comparative Fault.” Finally, perhaps there is no evidence that 
“Comparative Fault” impacted damages because it was common practice to not claim 
damages unless the plaintiff was less than 50% guilty. If the law solely put the state’s 
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practices into written law, rather than forcing these practices to change, there would be no 
significant impact on damages.  
With ineffective punitive damage reform in the early 1970s, another law was 
passed in 1987, “Caps on Punitive Damages I.” “Caps on Punitive Damages I” limited 
punitive damages to either $200,000 or two times the economic damages (whichever is 
greater), on top of no more than $750,000 of noneconomic damages.  This law expanded 
the previous one in 1973 by more specifically laying out the limit of punitive damages, 
with the aim of directly decreasing the size of punitive damages rewarded. The results in 
Table 5 suggest that total allocated loss decreased by 28% after the law become effective. 
This is highly significant at the 1% significance level. There is no evidence of a decrease 
in economic loss or noneconomic loss, implying the majority of the decreased total 
allocated loss is driven by a decrease in punitive damages. From this, we can confidently 
say that the law “Caps on Punitive Damages I” effectively reduced punitive damages.  
This law lasted until September 1, 1995 when a new cap on punitive damages was 
passed. The final punitive damages reform, noted as “Caps on Punitive Damages 2,” 
limits punitive damages to the greater of $200,000 or four times the amount of economic 
damages + noneconomic damages. According to the Journal of Consumer & Commercial 
Law, “the Republican controlled legislature enacted a broad reform agenda that 
attempt[ed] to limit the amount of damages… exempt certain large transactions, and 
make it easier for defendants to force a settlement” (Alderman 2005). Essentially, the 
goal of this law is to further increase the power of the defendants by limiting punitive 
damages. From the results in Table 5, we can infer that since “Caps on Punitive Damages 
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2” came into effect, total allocated loss has decreased by 85.4%. This figure holds at the 
1% significance level. Both the changes in economic loss and noneconomic loss are not 
significant, implying that the large drop is driven by decreasing punitive damages. This 
effect is relatively extreme, highlighting the law’s impressive success over time. 
In general, since a failed first attempt at capping punitive damages, Texas 
legislature has succeeded at reducing punitive damages.  
V. C. Joint and Several Liability Reform 
 The final grouping of laws aims to restrict joint and several liability by 
prohibiting its application unless the defendant reaches a certain threshold of guilt. 
According to the American Tort Reform Association, “joint and several liability is a 
theory that permits the plaintiff to recover damages from multiple defendants 
collectively, or from each defendant individually” (Joint and Several Liability Rule 
Reform). Theoretically, if a state follows joint and several liability, a defendant who is 
just 10% guilty could end up paying for 100% of damages if the other defendants are 
unable to pay (“Joint and Several Liability Rule Reform | ATRA.”) Advocates of the rule 
site the plaintiff’s right to recover total damages from an injury minus his or her own 
fault. On the other hand, restricting this rule protects defendants from paying a 
disproportionate level of damages from their degree of fault (“Joint and Several Liability 
Rule Reform”). In limiting the use of joint and several liability, total damages would 
theoretically decrease—if a defendant doesn’t have to pay for another’s damages who 
can’t afford it, the plaintiff would not receive the same amount of damages on average. 
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  The first legislation passed in Texas limiting joint and several liability reform  
was passed in 1985, and has since been amended three times, each time more and more 
restricting its application. In this section, by looking at the behavior of damages after 
each of the four laws pass, I am able to quantitatively measure the laws’ effectiveness. 
 The first law in this grouping, “Joint and Several Liability 1,” was passed on 
September 1, 1985 and prohibited joint and several liability in the case where a plaintiff 
is more guilty than a defendant. This would mean that if a plaintiff is 45% guilty, 
application of the rule is no longer allowed. From the results in Table 5, we can discern 
that total allocated loss decreased by 18.6% after this legislature became effective. This 
loss was driven by the 9% drop in economic loss, and large decrease in punitive damages. 
While the impact on total allocated loss and economic loss is significant at the 1% level, 
there is no sizable or significant effect on noneconomic loss. This effect not only shows 
the success of “Joint and Several Liability 1,” but also suggests that an introductory 
constraint on the use of joint and several liability does succeed at limiting damages paid 
by defendants.  
 Starting with the first reform in 1987, three reforms have amended “Joint and 
Several Liability 1,” adding what appeared to be more stringent constraints. “Joint and 
Several Liability 2,” effective September, 1987 to September, 1995, prohibited joint and 
several liability in cases where the defendant is less than 20% at fault, or less than 10% at 
fault if the plaintiff has no guilt. “Joint and Several Liability 3,” effective from 
September, 1995 to July, 2003, increased the threshold of defendant guilt to 50% if the 
plaintiff holds some blame, and 15% if the plaintiff is blameless.  Finally, “Joint and 
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Several Liability 4,” effective since July 2003, prohibited joint and several liability in 
cases where the defendant is less than 50% guilty, regardless of the plaintiff’s level of 
guilt. However, Table 5 shows no evidence that “Joint and Several Liability 2, ” “Joint 
and Several Liability 3,” and “Joint and Several Liability 4” decrease total allocated loss, 
economic loss, or noneconomic loss.  
There are a couple potential explanations for this. First, perhaps the cases that 
took advantage of joint and several liability were solely those where the plaintiff was 
more guilty than the defendant. In this instance, after “Joint and Several Liability 1” was 
passed and outlawed its application in those cases, no one would have used the rule 
anymore. As a result, the following three laws may have worked to impact a rule that was 
no longer commonly used, and therefore had no impact on damages.  
Another explanation could be the potential multicollinearity that exists between 
the last three joint and several liability laws and the other reforms. When looking at the 
set of regressions that include the individual law variables by themselves (Table 6), there 
is a highly significant decrease in total damages after each additional joint and several 
liability law is passed. While I don’t feel comfortable using these data points as evidence 
that the legislature was successful because of the omitted variable bias of excluding 9 
other laws, it does suggest that multicollinearity potentially exists between the joint and 
several liability reforms.   
V. D. Potential Flaws 
One potential flaw in my analysis is the presence of multicollinearity. I attempted 
to mitigate this impact by grouping a few law reforms that had similar dates into one law 
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variable. Similarly, I include a series of regressions that only include one law variable at 
a time to check for possible correlation between the existing law variables. However, 
with this set of regressions there is omitted variable bias in that it assumes no other laws 
were passed. In cases where multicollinearity may be a problem, I acknowledge that 
when describing the results.  
 Another potential source of error could be the data itself. In Avraham’s Database 
of State Law Reforms (5
th
 edition), he mentions that this is the most prevalent law 
reform, however acknowledges that updates may be made as more information becomes 
available. Similarly, the Texas Department of Insurance Closed Claim Survey includes 
225,791 entries from 1988-2012, accounting for 220 variables in each entry. Because of 
the expansive nature of the data in terms of number of observations and variables 
accounted for, it is possible that a few data points are inaccurate.  
 One thing my argument is missing is a comparison of this success with the 
success of other states. Throughout the paper I label Texas as the “tort reform state,” but 
in order to gauge the reforms’ success I would need a baseline of other state’s success. 
What’s more, it would be interesting to more extensively talk about the uniqueness of the 
specific reforms within Texas. How aggressive is this reform in limiting damages 
recovered when compared to other states? This would be worthwhile to expand upon in 
order to fully understand the uniqueness of Texas reform.  
VI. Conclusion 
 With its aggressive history of tort law reform, Texas is known as the “tort reform 
state” (LeMance 2015). With a goal of shifting plaintiffs’ behaviors, and decreasing 
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doctors’ defensive behaviors, the reform has aimed to decrease damages rewarded. Most 
existing research has looked at changes in behavior after each reform. Previous research 
also discusses the impact a 2003 cap on noneconomic damages has had on damages 
recovered in medical malpractice lawsuits. However, this is the first paper to give a 
comprehensive empirical analysis on Texas tort law and the impact it has had on damages 
recovered. By analyzing the extent of each reform, and nature of its impact on the 
different aspects of damages, I am able to make conclusions on the impact of each law on 
damages recovered and make claims regarding the nature of effective state-level tort law 
reform.  
The findings suggest inconsistent success in caps to damages in medical liability 
cases.  The results imply that a cap to total damages in medical liability cases do show 
evidence of an impact, however only if punitive damages are not included in the total 
damage figure. When punitive damages were excluded in the cap to total damages, the 
reform decreased economic loss by 42.9% and noneconomic loss by 37.6%. What’s 
more, the most recent legislature in 2003 succeeded at decreasing noneconomic damages 
by over 9%. These results suggest that future legislation should be geared at capping 
economic or noneconomic damages, but not a total damages figure that includes punitive 
damages. Other implications of these results revolve around healthcare physician 
behavior in Texas. With the lowered potential damages a physician may pay, it would 
follow that doctors are more comfortable with practicing medicine in Texas. The 
previous research highlighted in II.C. confirms an influx in doctors in Texas post reform. 
Another positive implication of the lower damages post the 2003 reform would be a 
decrease in healthcare costs for patients. One would think that because doctors are paying 
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lower damages to patients, they would charge less for services. As discussed in II.C., 
other research has shown inconsistent evidence on the changing medical costs post 
reform. While defensive medicine seems to decrease (Avraham, et al., 2010), it appears 
that aggregate health care costs have stayed constant (Paik et al., 2012). 
The most recent caps on punitive damages were successfully at limiting punitive 
damages rewarded. Since a failed attempt at restricting punitive damages in the early 70s, 
caps on punitive damage legislature decreased total damages by 28% in 1987 and 85% in 
1995. This increase in effectiveness of each punitive damage law implies that Texas 
legislature is becoming more effective at restricting punitive damages—they are more 
aware of specifically how to impose a cap. The first failed cap solely limited the reward 
in respect to its relation to economic damages. However, the successful caps on punitive 
damages placed specific dollar values on the amount of the cap, and added requirements 
to the required evidence standard that must be proved. This suggests that in order to have 
the most success, legislature geared at capping punitive damages in the future must have 
specific value caps along with a description of an evidence standard.  
Finally, with the goal of restricting use of joint and several liability, an 
introductory legislature effectively decreased total damages by 18.6%. This was followed 
by three additional amendments where no meaningful impact was found on damages 
rewarded. These results suggest that the application of joint and several liability is 
potentially outdated. Another potential implication is that this rule is only used in cases 
where the plaintiff has nearly no guilt whatsoever. Because the most recent legislation in 
2003 prohibited the use of joint and several liability unless the defendant is 50% or more 
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at fault than the plaintiff, and there is no evidence of an impact on damages, one can 
assume the rule has never been used if the plaintiff has substantial guilt. As a result, in 
order to substantially lower damages recovered, any new restriction to the application of 
joint and several liability must mandate the plaintiff have essentially no guilt. 
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APPENDIX 
Table 1. Texas Tort Law Reforms 
Effective Date Reform Description 
September 1, 
1973 
Comparative Fault In an action to recover damages, the claimant damages 
are reduced in proportion to his own culpable conduct 
as compared to the defendant(s) culpable conduct. The 
claimant is barred from claiming damages if his 
culpable conduct is greater than the cumulative 
culpable conduct of all culpable defendants. 
   
1973 Caps on Punitive Damages 
(Deceptive Traded Practice, 
Product Liability) 
Limits the award of punitive damages to three times 
economic damages 
   
August 29, 
1977 to May 
11, 1988 
Caps on Total Damages 
(Medical Liability, Non 
Wrongful Death claims) 
Limits total damages to $500,000 (indexed to CPI). 
Medical costs are excluded from cap. 
   
August 29, 
1977 
Caps on Total Damages 
(Medical Liability, 
Wrongful Death) 
Total damages shall not exceed $500,000 (indexed to 
CPI) in wrongful death actions. Medical costs are 
excluded from cap. Punitive damages are excluded 
from cap. 
   
September 1, 
1985 to 
September 2, 
1987 
Joint and Several Liability 1 Prohibits the application of joint and several liability 
unless defendant is more at fault than plaintiff 
   
September 2, 
1987 to 
September 1, 
1995 
Punitive Damages 
(Evidence) 1 
Requires a plaintiff to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that a defendant's actions were fraudulent, 
malicious, or grossly negligent 
   
September 2, 
1987 to 
September 1, 
1995 
Caps on Punitive Damages 
1 
Limits the award of punitive damages to the greater of 
$200,000 or four times the award of actual damages. 
Caps do not apply for certain intentional acts that are 
also felonies. 
   
September 2, 
1987 to 
September 1, 
1995 
Joint and Several Liability 2 Prohibits the application of joint and several liability 
unless defendant is more than 20% at fault, or if 
plaintiff is blameless, defendant is more than 10% at 
fault, and there is a toxic tort. 
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September 1, 
1995 
Caps on Punitive Damages 
2 
Limits the award of punitive damages to the greater of 
$200,000 or two times the award of economic damages 
plus non-economic damages up to $750,000, with 
exceptions for certain intentional acts that are also 
felonies. 
   
September 1, 
1995 
Punitive Damages 
(Evidence) 2 
Requires that a plaintiff show by clear and convincing 
evidence that defendant is guilty of fraud, malice, or 
willful or wanton conduct 
   
September 1, 
1995 to July 1, 
2003 
Joint and Several Liability 3 Prohibits the application of joint and several liability 
unless defendant is more than 50% at fault, or if 
plaintiff is blameless, defendant is more than 15% at 
fault, and there is a toxic tort. 
   
July 1, 2003 Joint and Several Liability 4 Prohibits the application of joint and several liability 
unless defendance is 50% or more at fault. 
   
September 1, 
2003 
Periodic Payments (Medical 
Liability) 
The court may, at the request of either party, order that 
future damages above $100,000 will be paid in periodic 
payments 
   
September 1, 
2003 
Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 1 
Limits noneconomic damages to $250,000 in medical 
malpractice cases against doctors ($250,000 per 
facility, with an overall cap of $500,000). 
   
Adopted 
September 13, 
2003 
Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 2 
Constitutional amendment that provides that the Texas 
Legislature has the authroity to place limits on 
noneconomic damages for healthcare related lawsuits. 
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Table 2. Variable Description   
Variable Description 
Independent- Year Each year from 1988-2012 
Independent- Law Reform 10 distinct law reform groupings 
Independent- Injury Type Death 
Independent- Injury Type Amputation 
Independent- Injury Type Burns (heat) 
Independent- Injury Type Burns (chemical) 
Independent- Injury Type Systemic poisoning (toxic) 
Independent- Injury Type Systemic poisoning (other) 
Independent- Injury Type Eye injury (blindness) 
Independent- Injury Type Respiratory condition 
Independent- Injury Type Nervous condition 
Independent- Injury Type Hearing loss or impairment 
Independent- Injury Type Circulatory condition 
Independent- Injury Type Multiple injuries 
Independent- Injury Type Back injury 
Independent- Injury Type Skin disorder 
Independent- Injury Type Brain damage 
Independent- Injury Type Scarring 
Independent- Injury Type Spinal cord injuries 
Independent- Injury Type Other injury 
Independent- Injury Type Off road vehicle 
Independent- Injury Type Air transportation 
Independent- Injury Type Railway 
Independent- Injury Type Other motor vehicle 
Independent- Injury Type Surgical/medical care 
Independent- Injury Type Falls 
Independent- Injury Type Drowning 
Independent- Injury Type Use of defective product 
Independent- Injury Type Fire 
Independent- Injury Type Firearms 
Independent- Injury Type Pollution/ Toxic exposure 
Independent- Injury Type Explosions 
Independent- Injury Type Use of agricultural machinery 
Independent- Injury Type Oil and gas extraction 
Independent- Injury Type Other 
Independent- Policy Type Monoline general liability 
Independent- Policy Type Commercial auto liability 
Independent- Policy Type Texas commercial multiperil 
Independent- Policy Type Medical professional liability 
37 
 
Independent- Policy Type Other professional liability 
Dependent Total allocated loss 
Dependent Economic loss 
Dependent Non-economic loss 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLES 
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
            
Year Claim Closed 225,791 1,999 6.322 1,988 2,010 
Death 225,791 0.077 0.266 0 1 
Amputation 225,791 0.008 0.089 0 1 
Burns (heat) 225,791 0.009 0.097 0 1 
Burns (chemical) 225,791 0.003 0.052 0 1 
Systemic poisoning 
(toxic) 225,791 0.009 0.096 0 1 
Systemic poisoning 
(other) 225,791 0.001 0.038 0 1 
Eye Injury (blindness) 225,791 0.006 0.079 0 1 
Respiratory condition 225,791 0.012 0.111 0 1 
Nervous condition 225,791 0.007 0.084 0 1 
Hearing loss or 
impairment 225,791 0.003 0.052 0 1 
Circulatory condition 225,791 0.004 0.062 0 1 
Multiple injuries 225,791 0.171 0.377 0 1 
Back injury 225,791 0.197 0.398 0 1 
Skin disorder 225,791 0.002 0.050 0 1 
Brain damage 225,791 0.022 0.146 0 1 
Scarring 225,791 0.020 0.140 0 1 
Spinal cord injuries 225,791 0.009 0.094 0 1 
Other 225,791 0.124 0.330 0 1 
Off road Vehicle 225,791 0.006 0.078 0 1 
Air transportation 225,791 0.000 0.012 0 1 
Railway 225,791 0.001 0.038 0 1 
Other Motor Vehicle 225,791 0.264 0.441 0 1 
Surgical/Medical care 225,791 0.093 0.290 0 1 
Falls 225,791 0.094 0.291 0 1 
Drowining 225,791 0.002 0.048 0 1 
Use of defective 
product 225,791 0.024 0.152 0 1 
Fire 225,791 0.004 0.064 0 1 
Firearms 225,791 0.003 0.057 0 1 
Pollution/Toxic 
exposure 225,791 0.011 0.106 0 1 
Explosions 225,791 0.004 0.065 0 1 
Use of agricultural 
machinery 225,791 0.001 0.037 0 1 
Oil & gas extraction 225,791 0.003 0.059 0 1 
Other 225,791 0.064 0.245 0 1 
Categorical 225,789 1.921 1.152 1 5 
Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 1, Caps on 
Noneconomic Damages 
(Medical Liability) 2, 
Periodic Payments 
225,791 0.542 1.153 0 3 
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(Medical Liability) 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages 2, Punitive 
Damages (Evidence) 2 
225,791 1.055 0.998 0 2 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages 1, Punitive 
Damages Evidence 1 
225,791 0.797 0.971 0 2 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages (Deceptive 
Trade Practice, Product 
Liability), Comparative 
Fault 
225,791 0.102 0.302 0 1 
Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Non Wrongful 
Death Claims) 2 
225,791 0.997 0.053 0 1 
Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Wrongful 
Death) 1 
225,791 1.997 0.077 0 2 
Joint and Several 
Liability 4 
225,791 0.184 0.388 0 1 
Joint and Several 
Liability 3 
225,791 0.343 0.475 0 1 
Joint and Several 
Liability 2 
225,791 0.571 0.495 0 1 
Joint and Several 
Liability 1 
225,791 0.047 0.212 0 1 
Total Allocated loss 225,791 14,113 91,418 0 3.30E+07 
Economic loss 225,791 11,960 114,308 0 1.33E+07 
Non-economic loss 225,791 23,766 174,520 0 1.29E+07 
ln(Allocated loss) 147,700 8.727 1.789 -0.564 17.31 
ln(Economic loss) 42,176 9.782 1.417 2.931 16.4 
ln(Non-economic loss) 49,634 10.340 1.396 3.985 16.37 
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Table 4. Texas Tort Law Timeline  
Comparative Fault- Effective 1973 
Caps on Punitive Damages (Deceptive Traded Practice, Product Liability) - Effective 1973 
Caps on Total Damages (Medical 
Liability, Non Wrongful Death 
Claims- Effective 1977- 1988 
Caps on Total Damages (Medical Liability, Wrongful Death) - Effective 1977 
Joint and 
Several 
Liability 
1- 
Effective 
1985-
1987 
Punitive 
Damages 
(Evidence) 1 and 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages 1- 
Effective 1987- 
1995 
Joint and Several 
Liability 2 
Effective 1987- 
1995 
Punitive Damages (Evidence) 2 and Caps on 
Punitive Damages 2- Effective 1995 
Joint and Several 
Liability 3- Effective 
1995-2003 
Joint and Several 
Liability 4- 
Effective 2003 
Periodic Payments 
and Caps on 
Noneconomic 
Damages 1 and 2 
(Medical 
Liability) – 
Effective 2003 
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Table 5. Regression summary table using all laws in regressions 
   
 
  Regression Type 
Law Names   Total Allocated Loss   Economic Loss   
Noneconomic 
Loss 
Caps on Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 1, Caps on 
Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 2, Periodic 
Payments (Medical 
Liability) 
 
-0.117 
 
0.00313 
 
-0.0978** 
  
(0.0736) 
 
(0.0517) 
 
(0.0457) 
       Caps on Punitive 
Damages 2, Punitive 
Damages (Evidence) 2 
 
-0.854*** 
 
-0.0366 
 
-0.289 
  
(0.166) 
 
(0.297) 
 
(0.265) 
       Caps on Punitive 
Damages 1, Punitive 
Damages Evidence 1 
 
-0.280*** 
 
-0.0213 
 
-0.0372 
  
(0.0324) 
 
(0.0401) 
 
(0.0357) 
       Caps on Punitive 
Damages (Deceptive 
Trade Practice, 
Product Liability), 
Comparative Fault 
 
0.306*** 
 
0.0204 
 
-0.000396 
  
(0.0730) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.0984) 
       Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Non 
Wrongful Death 
Claims) 
 
0.383*** 
 
0.223*** 
 
0.0222 
  
(0.0258) 
 
(0.0332) 
 
(0.0295) 
       Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Wrongful 
Death) 
 
0.180 
 
-0.429*** 
 
-0.376*** 
  
(0.115) 
 
(0.159) 
 
(0.141) 
       Joint and Several 
Liability 4 
 
0.280 
 
-0.153 
 
0.671 
  
(0.337) 
 
(0.604) 
 
(0.539) 
       Joint and Several 
Liability 3 
 
0.626* 
 
-0.0475 
 
0.547 
  
(0.330) 
 
(0.592) 
 
(0.528) 
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       Joint and Several 
Liability 2 
 
-0.00679 
 
-0.0472 
 
0.0882 
  
(0.0705) 
 
(0.0881) 
 
(0.0783) 
       Joint and Several 
Liability 1 
 
-0.186*** 
 
-0.0898*** 
 
0.0121 
  
(0.0251) 
 
(0.0312) 
 
(0.0274) 
 
Notes: Table reports the coefficients for the linear regression of the impact of each law 
reform variable on either total allocated loss, economic loss, or noneconomic loss. Each 
cell within the table above represents a different regression. Each of the regressions also 
includes controls for the other law reform variables, year, policy type, and injury type. 
The standard error of each coefficient estimate is presented in the parentheses below. The 
asterix specifies the level of significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%). 
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Table 6. Regression Summary Table Using Individual Laws in Regressions 
 
 
  Regression Type 
Law Names   Total Allocated Loss   Economic Loss   Noneconomic Loss 
Caps on 
Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 1, Caps on 
Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 2, Periodic 
Payments (Medical 
Liability) 
 
-0.345*** 
 
-0.0422*** 
 
-0.0288** 
  
(0.00789) 
 
(0.0148) 
 
(0.0128) 
       Caps on Punitive 
Damages 2, Punitive 
Damages (Evidence) 
2 
 
-0.262*** 
 
-0.0154 
 
-0.0229** 
  
(0.00695) 
 
(0.0108) 
 
(0.00912) 
       Caps on Punitive 
Damages 1, Punitive 
Damages Evidence 1 
 
0.0185*** 
 
-0.0453*** 
 
0.00806 
  
(0.00555) 
 
(0.00781) 
 
(0.00661) 
       Caps on Punitive 
Damages (Deceptive 
Trade Practice, 
Product Liability), 
Comparative Fault 
 
0.0734 
 
-0.193** 
 
-0.182** 
  
(0.0469) 
 
(0.0847) 
 
(0.0715) 
       Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Non 
Wrongful Death 
Claims) 
 
0.677*** 
 
0.233*** 
 
0.00492 
  
(0.0161) 
 
(0.0207) 
 
(0.0179) 
       Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Wrongful 
Death) 
 
0.0283 
 
-0.378*** 
 
-0.362*** 
  
(0.0714) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.0995) 
       Joint and Several 
Liability 4 
 
-1.004*** 
 
-0.130*** 
 
-0.0657* 
  
(0.0234) 
 
(0.0438) 
 
(0.0380) 
       Joint and Several 
Liability 3 
 
-0.128*** 
 
0.000477 
 
-0.0244 
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(0.0121) 
 
(0.0194) 
 
(0.0164) 
       Joint and Several 
Liability 2 
 
-0.155*** 
 
-0.0954*** 
 
0.00722 
  
(0.00988) 
 
(0.0144) 
 
(0.0122) 
       Joint and Several 
Liability 1 
 
0.329*** 
 
0.0828*** 
 
0.000475 
  
(0.0181) 
 
(0.0219) 
 
(0.0195) 
 
Notes: Table reports the coefficients for the linear regression of the impact of each law 
reform variable on either total allocated loss, economic loss, or noneconomic loss. Each 
cell within the table above represents a different regression. Each of the regressions also 
includes controls for year, policy type, and injury type. The standard error of each 
coefficient estimate is presented in the parentheses below. The asterix specifies the level 
of significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%). 
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Table 7. Policy Type Regressions 
 
          
Law Names 
Monoline 
general 
liability 
Commercial 
auto liability 
Texas 
Commercial 
multiperil 
Medical 
professional 
liability 
Other 
professional 
liability 
            
Caps on 
Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 1, Caps on 
Noneconomic 
Damages (Medical 
Liability) 2, Periodic 
Payments (Medical 
Liability) 
 
-0.196*** -0.348*** -0.153** -0.211** -0.597* 
(0.0564) (0.0685) (0.0610) (0.0861) (0.338) 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages 2, Punitive 
Damages (Evidence) 
2 
 
-1.227*** -1.332*** -0.562* -0.505 -0.343** 
(0.242) (0.427) (0.331) (0.489) (0.166) 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages 1, Punitive 
Damages Evidence 1 
 
-0.438*** -0.326*** -0.207*** -0.280*** -0.299 
(0.0617) (0.0721) (0.0513) (0.0745) (0.320) 
Caps on Punitive 
Damages (Deceptive 
Trade Practice, 
Product Liability), 
Comparative Fault 
 
-2.580** 0.134 0.251*** 0.765*** 1.470** 
(1.127) (0.129) (0.0911) (0.218) (0.595) 
Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Non 
Wrongful Death 
Claims) 
 
0.706*** 0.180*** 0.146*** 0.403*** 0.791*** 
(0.0479) (0.0607) (0.0416) (0.0600) (0.273) 
Caps on Total 
Damages (Medical 
Liability, Wrongful 
Death) 
 
4.525*** 0.277* 0.0670 0.891*** -1.628 
(1.602) (0.161) (0.160) (0.308) (1.014) 
Joint and Several 
Liability 4 0.136 1.468* 0.200 -0.656 0.438 
(0.490) (0.862) (0.675) (0.994) (0.780) 
Joint and Several 
Liability 3 
0.659 1.650* 0.470 -0.363 
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Notes: Table reports the coefficients for the linear regression of the impact of each law 
reform variable on the total allocated loss within each of the five policy types. Each cell 
within the table above represents a different regression. Each of the regressions also 
includes controls for the other law reform variables, year, policy type, and injury type. 
The standard error of each coefficient estimate is presented in the parentheses below. The 
asterix specifies the level of significance (* = 10%, ** = 5%, *** = 1%). 
  
(0.479) (0.852) (0.661) (0.975)  
Joint and Several 
Liability 2 
-0.119 0.0553 -0.118 -0.172 0.531 
(0.136) (0.156) (0.111) (0.164) (0.705) 
Joint and Several 
Liability 1 -0.439*** -0.269*** -0.144*** -0.342*** -0.00640 
(0.0564) (0.0470) (0.0385) (0.0609) (0.221) 
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